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The paper introduces the topic of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and sev-
eral other forms of microcredit institutions, variations of which are found in most communities 
around the world, and considers the impact on them of the current financial crisis. For many 
women and men, poor and wealthy alike, these institutions have been economic and social life-
lines. Among many African peoples, they provide the main source of rural and urban credit, both 
for sustainable living and entrepreneurial endeavour. This paper draws on the experience of con-
temporary Cameroonians, including those in the diaspora, in particular that of Dr Bridget Teboh. 
Social anthropologists have espoused ROSCAs for many decades. This paper cites the increasing 
attention such institutions now get from governments, NGOs, bankers and economists, and con-
siders the impact of the current worldwide financial crisis on the behaviour of those who save in 
them. 
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Microfinance in West Africa has been a recurrent theme among my diversified aca-
demic interests, being the topic of my first and this, my most recent paper. As soon as I 
graduated, I went straight out to West Africa with my husband to live among the Igbo of 
Nigeria. I had read some economics as an undergraduate, and soon after arriving in the 
village, I wrote my first paper for a conference at Ibadan on the savings clubs which were 
so critical to village life (Ardener 1953). A few years later, on returning to Oxford, I sought 
out as much comparative material as I could find and wrote an analytical paper (Ardener 
1964; reprinted in Ardener 1995). My interests then turned to other topics for some years 
until I convened a workshop, the results of which were published in 1995 as Money-Go-
Rounds; the Importance of ROSCAs for Women, which I edited with Sandra Burman.
ROSCAs are associations in which members regularly contribute to a fund that is 
given in whole or in part to each contributor in turn. This simple formula – and in par-
ticular its rotating feature – has made the ROSCA a surprisingly enduring and flexible 
instrument, which has helped millions of the poor – both women and men. The usage 
“ROSCA” is a scholarly, or literary, term, not one normally used by those who make use of 
these institutions, who have their own, various, names for them. It identifies one form of afrika focus — Volume 23, Nr. 2 [12]
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saving institution, with features as defined hereabove. Today, as before, for many devel-
oping countries microcredit is the main source of rural capital – far surpassing the sums 
available to the general public from banks, NGOs and international aid programmes. We 
also find ROSCAs used by the well-off, even by those in high political circles, both for 
their economic and social benefits.
It sounds simple. Let’s say that each month for a year, a group meets and each 
present puts equal amounts of money in a pot. At each meeting, the pot is then given to 
one of the members, and again for twelve times until all the members have had their turn 
to receive it. At the end of the cycle it may close, or continue its rotation over again, even 
many times. There are many variations of this model in real life. Small groups of 12 – 50 
members are common, but they can be scaled up to many hundreds of members. Dues 
can range from a handful of rice to cheques valued at hundreds of euros – yielding pots 
of thousands. Transactions are transparent; if the pot is handed over to a member each 
time there is no banker. 
If everyone puts in the same and each gets out the same, members usually feel they 
are equal. But do they get the same benefits? No, not exactly. For the early birds to take the 
pot get credit from those members yet to take. Given this inequality, why is the ROSCA 
so popular, both among villagers and elites in India and Africa? Indeed, as my colleague 
Charles Fonchingong noted in 2008, 90% of the old people he was interviewing in Cam-
eroon belonged to ROSCAs. In much richer Taiwan, 80% of the people still belong to RO-
SCAs (Besley and Levinson 1993). ROSCAs under the name of “chit funds” (also known 
by many local names) have long existed on the Indian sub-continent. Some of these were 
commercially driven. Traditional ROSCAs continue among the Indian Diaspora (see 
Shaila Srinivasan 1995). ROSCAs are also found in Japan and the USA. I guess there must 
be many thousands who save in ROSCAs in the UK. No doubt there are many in Belgium. 
Little regarded when I began, it is not surprising that now anthropologists, economists, 
bankers and government officials write so much about microfinance.
I have attended a number of ROSCA meetings. One, which took place at the Univer-
sity of Buea in Cameroon, was mainly composed of university lecturers. The meeting was 
held in a private house. Members were present with their wives and children. The atmos-
phere was jovial, with a sense of excitement at seeing the handfuls of money building up. 
Over drinks, people watched the money collected being counted out by two or three of the 
members – to much banter, teasing accusations and counter accusation, and hilarity. The 
person to be hosting the next session – and the next to take the pot – was singled out for 
attention. The order of rotation seemed to be already determined. A delicious buffet and 
drinks were provided by the family getting the pot.
Cameroon village ROSCAs are similar in principle, though sometimes on a more 
modest scale. At the other end of the range, in some countries ROSCA meetings may take 
place in posh hotels or cafés (Ardener, 1995, p.10; Khatib-Chahidi 1995, p.246-47).
Before I come to reviewing their overall advantages and disadvantages, let me give 
you a personal story. In September 2009, when I was putting an early version of this pa-
per together for a meeting of the Oxford Alumni Weekend, by chance I was visited by my afrika focus — 2010-12 [ 13 ]
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Cameroon friend Professor Bridget Teboh, a university lecturer at the University of Mas-
sachusetts at Dartmouth, USA. Bridget shares my interest in ROSCAs and kindly told me 
about her own current savings. 
Bridget belongs to no fewer than six ROSCAs in the United States and to one ROSCA 
back in Cameroon. Let us take first the six in the States. All the members come from 
Cameroon, mostly from Bridget’s own ethnic group, the Moghamo. Four of them are 
open to both men and women, while the other two are women-only.
As for size – three of them have 12 members each, one has 14 members, and another 
has 15 members, while the biggest has 20 members. In those with more than 12 mem-
bers, two or more share their monthly payment and their pot (or in Bridget’s terms their 
“pick”) when it is their turn to get it. The biggest of her ROSCAs, with 20 members has 
15 “picks” – which means that half the members share the cost of their inputs and their 
pots.
Cameroon ROSCAs often have fancy, sometimes ironical, names, such as “The Mod-
est Sisters” (Niger-Thomas 1995, pp. 104-05); Bridget’s elite group have dubbed theirs 
the “Stress Free Group”; another of her ROSCAs is known as the “Girls’ Night Out” or 
the “All Girls’ Njanggi” – Njangi being the Cameroon name for a savings club. 
As for the members: in one of Bridget’s American ROSCAs, all are former fellow 
undergraduates from the University she attended in Yaounde, four of whom are in Bos-
ton, USA, and three are in Cameroon, five being elsewhere. They all send their dues by 
cheque. In one of Bridget’s women-only ROSCAs, all members are former classmates, 
who entered the same school in 1972, in Mbengwi, Cameroon. This small group is part 
of a larger association of 50 classmates, which has lasted 37 years – so far! Bridget’s other 
all-women Cameroon group are civil servants and the like, all resident and working in 
America. 
We can see that, through Bridget’s American-based ROSCAs, she is in close contact 
with 123 Cameroonians, plus their families and friends.  Some of them she sees monthly, 
others meet at occasional get-togethers in Washington or Los Angeles. These circles of 
Cameroon friends within America form an important social network for Bridget. In aca-
demic jargon they are part of her “social capital”. While most ROSCAs are jolly affairs, 
with food, drink and general merriment, “social capital” offers much more than that (see 
Ardener 1964 and 1995).
So, how much does this all cost Bridget? Her dues vary from $50 to 500 dollars each 
month. Altogether then she pays (saves) 1,300 dollars monthly – a sizable amount from 
an academic salary. 
If this is what Bridget pays in, what has she already got out on credit? By the middle 
of 2009 when she met me she had already taken one “pick” of $7,500 and one “pick” of 
$2,400, both of which she sent home to her village in Cameroon so that her mother could 
refurbish her house, ready for the over-due second burial celebrations of her father who 
died in 1977 – an important obligation for any family. Bridget also took out 3,000 dollars 
for an air fare to Europe (to give an academic paper) and for related expenses. The rest 
she kept to cover her dues till the end of her seven ROSCA cycles. Meanwhile, Bridget afrika focus — Volume 23, Nr. 2 [14]
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still has one “pick” of $600 and one of $7,500 in her American-based ROSCAs which she 
hasn’t yet received.
When you think about it, Bridget is a creditor to those members in her six ROSCAs 
who took their “picks” before her; such lucky members will continue to pay off their 
debts in membership dues until all the members have received their turns. Now she is 
indebted to all those who contributed to the picks she has received so far.
So much for her American ROSCAs. There is more: Bridget is sending $50 each 
month to her mother in Moghamoland, to pay for 2 “picks” on her behalf to the Mogha-
mo Cultural and Development Association. This has 24 members, some of whom share 
their dues and picks, and some who, like her, pay twice each meeting towards 2 “picks”. 
Bridget has been fortunate in having received her “picks” already; she has already in-
vested the money in the purchase of land in Cameroon.
The range and scale of Bridget’s budgeting surprised me. Even she seemed surprised 
as she recounted this, and saw the table I had constructed from what she said. Certainly 
not all of my overseas Cameroon friends maintain such a complicated set of obligations 
(though they probably all belong to one or more ROSCAs). Why? Not only because it 
forces them to save. Each saver also helps others to save. Moreover, this is a public activ-
ity, through which people can build up a reputation for prudence and reliability. People 
will do almost anything to maintain their membership.
Indeed, to be unable to join a ROSCA comes close to social exclusion. Membership 
is not given lightly – it has to be earned. Bridget herself said it was an honour to belong 
to her groups. Elites who live outside their villages, at home or abroad, continue to send 
small dues back to their low-cost village ROSCAs, just to prove their solidarity with their 
kin. They thus affirm their identity as sons and daughters of the soil.
So far we have been talking only of rotating associations where all the savings paid 
in each month go out each month to one of the members. No banker is needed, thus 
avoiding the possibility of theft. This feature is very comforting, especially to the poor 
and uneducated, who are generally risk adverse. As noted, they feel confident because 
they can see the transparency of the system, especially in the common local, face-to-face, 
associations.
There are also microcredit clubs which do not rotate. These are sometimes known 
as ASCRAs (Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations – in which payments vary), 
or RESCAs (Regular Savings and Credit Associations). Such groups may get help from 
NGOs which start them off with a float, and which expect loans to be made and repaid. 
They need a trustworthy, even-handed “banker”, and they need good accounting and 
transparency procedures – which they do not always get. The best work well, but they are 
more prone than ROSCAs to discontent and even meltdown. 
Often ASCRAs and RESCAs omit some of the face-to-face arrangements found in 
most of the smaller ROSCAs. ASCRAs and RESCAs usually require guarantors who pro-
vide sureties (known in Cameroon as “shortees”; Niger-Thomas 1995 p.108), since – es-
pecially in the larger ones – reputations are not so easily assessed. ASCRAs may rent 
premises (see the case of Kenya noted below) and they may be able to accumulate bigger afrika focus — 2010-12 [ 15 ]
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lump sums loans than ROSCAs. In other words, they begin to approach mini-bankhood. 
Indeed the accumulated funds may well be deposited in a bank, or with a credit union. 
Of course, as they become more formalized, they may become more distant, both geo-
graphically and in relations between the officers and members. Peer pressure may be 
encouraged, but usually it is not as intense as in the ROSCAs. Yet they are found useful.   
As noted, 90% of the elderly people interviewed by Fonchingong belonged to ROSCAs, 
but 60% of them also had money in a credit union (usually run as an ASCRA). Since each 
member’s savings in an ASCRA may vary, their accumulations will not be equal; each 
ASCRA member’s deposit keeps its own accounting identity – unlike the pooled money 
collected in ROSCAs.
Of course, Cameroonians understand about one-to-one loans. They borrow from 
their family, money lenders and sometimes from banks. And, of course, members with 
recent “picks” can be turned to privately for urgent loans. Moreover, it is not uncom-
mon in a ROSCA to ask each member, as they get their “pick”, to put a fixed sum into a 
loan fund. The loan fund, sometimes called the “trouble” fund, can be augmented from 
fines (such as from those who come late, or otherwise transgress). Any members who are 
short of their dues, or who otherwise need a small loan, may borrow from this “trouble” 
fund, if other members agree. In which case, interest, often high, may well be charged. 
Finally, the money in the fund might be divided up, or spent on festivities, or on other 
agreed purposes. If the sum in the fund is carried forward to the next cycle, it may build 
up significantly. It requires a reliable custodian; today this may be someone with a bank 
account, and possibly a computer.
It will not surprise you to learn that Bridget, besides her 7 ROSCAs, also subscribes 
to an ASCRA, based in Washington.  It has 100 members in the USA, plus 40 in Cameroon 
who send money. Members pay in variable amounts, from $200 to $300 (the maximum). 
The money is banked in the USA. Consultations are currently taking place with their 
banker for the purchase of property, which is relatively cheap in America at the moment. 
Because the group has established a history of responsibility, it is likely that a bank loan 
will be forthcoming, which they plan to repay from accrued rents.
This is a risky business, but there are successful precedents.  For example, Nici Nel-
son (1995, pp. 61-62) tells in detail how a group of women living in Mathura Valley, then 
a slum part of Nairobi, started a simple ROSCA in 1970. After some time, members built 
a small lean-to with a cardboard roof, which after some successful years bore forth an 
ASCRA. With their accumulated funds the women bought a butcher’s shop, and later 
other property. By the 1990s, they had 3 bank accounts and an architect was designing a 
block of apartments for them.
In Cameroon, members of ROSCAs do not think of their “picks” as loans. Such 
money does not seem to be credit. Members get their money back sooner or later. It is 
rightfully theirs. They own it. The difference between the members is seen to be just one 
of timing. 
Some ROSCAs may be dedicated to particular household purchases – for example 
saucepans, clothing, or house building materials. Members might want to raise the so-afrika focus — Volume 23, Nr. 2 [16]
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cial standing of the group, and accordingly may check on how the pots are used. Such 
dedicated ROSCAs also prevent husbands from getting at their wives’ funds.
We noted that while ROSCA members may feel equal, they gain differently – those 
who take first can be first to buy desired consumables, to travel abroad, or to use the 
credit to generate income. Small-scale entrepreneurs often raise their working capital 
this way. It may offer them their first rung on the entrepreneurial ladder. The order of 
turn taking is therefore critical. Cameroonians usually decide the order in advance – by 
taking names from a hat, or by seniority of membership, or by repeating or reversing the 
former order.
In other countries, in Asia in particular, people may employ various sophisticated 
and sometimes extremely complex processes. This kind of ingenuity has fascinated me 
since I first became interested in ROSCAs. There is no time to cover all the sophisti-
cated arrangements people have thought up. These mechanisms rebalance the advan-
tages and disadvantages. Some of them are described in Money-Go-Rounds (Ardener 1995 
pp.202-204, 210-217) and in other available publications. Apart from taking the order by 
lot, members may compete, by offering to take a smaller pot; the bidding might be fiercer 
at the early point in the cycle. Sometimes this system is called a “Dutch auction”. Thus, 
by various methods, those taking early, end up paying more than they get, and those who 
wait, get more than they put in. The difference may be seen as a form of interest paid by 
those who take their turns at the beginning of the cycle to those who wait longer.
What may seem strange is that, even when no interest is involved, as is usually the 
case in Cameroon, many are prepared to wait their turn. Members may like to have un-
claimed funds, ring-fenced from daily subsistence demands and those from friends and 
family, which they can apply for in time of trouble. The order of the turns to take picks 
can be renegotiated. This valuable form of social security works well – provided members 
are mutually committed to helping out anyone who has an unexpected illness or death 
in the family, whose house burns down, or the like. Most face-to-face ROSCAs in Cam-
eroon work this way. Thus, the ROSCA can work like an insurance policy. Many people, 
like Bridget, therefore belong to several ROSCAs, some of which have already borne fruit 
while others are waiting to be harvested.
It often astonishes observers that ROSCAs very rarely fail to reach the end of a cycle. 
One reason is that members may already have mutual moral obligations to each other. 
Members also have a practical interest in helping each other maintain their dues. If any-
one defaults, not only will the creditors yet to get their pots lose them, but also the repu-
tation of the group will be at stake. According to Ian Fowler (personal communication), 
for this reason the failure of a ROSCA may be played down, especially as (in Cameroon) 
witchcraft accusations are often involved when they collapse. If a member does default, 
the others will together make up the deficit from the joint “trouble fund” if necessary. 
Because collapse of a ROSCA means loss of reputation for all, membership is not offered 
lightly. It will not be given to known defaulters. As noted, Bridget considered it an honour 
to join some ROSCAs. Too much depends on one’s reputation to lose it. Members wisely 
join groups where dues match their income. Or, as we have seen, two members some-afrika focus — 2010-12 [ 17 ]
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times pair-up, each paying half of each contribution (and getting half the pick) in order 
not to over-extend themselves, or a member may double his/her contribution and receive 
two “picks” – thus allowing members to operate together at different levels of contribu-
tion. Members often join several small ROSCAs with different dates for dues, to spread 
the risks. The longer the circle rotates the bigger the trust. Remember, Bridget’s school 
friends have been meeting since 1972 – now more than 37 years. My friend Dr Margaret 
Niger Thomas’ fourteen or so 'Modest Sisters' have been meeting monthly since 1983. In 
1991 they were contributing to a monthly lump sum then equivalent to £2,800 (see Niger-
Thomas 1995). 
ROSCAs are sometimes criticised for being small and unambitious. Yet big ones, 
with high dues do exist. The largest known to Bridget was in Douala, the Francophone 
business centre of Cameroon. This had a “pick” worth a little under £5000 (at today’s 
exchange rate). She had heard talk of one four times larger. Such high-value Cameroon 
ROSCAs are mainly based on a small group of “big men”, some of whom – if big enough 
– double their monthly dues and accordingly take two “picks”. Ian Fowler suggests (per-
sonal communication) that the term microcredit might no longer be appropriate when 
such sums are involved. In Cameroon, these big ROSCAs are known as tontines d’affaires, 
in contrast to the more domestic tontines de solidarité (see Rowlands 1995). Cameroon big 
men lay their money out to each other at a cost, sometimes reached by auction. Rather 
than have money lying idle and at risk at home, or earning little interest in a bank, such 
entrepreneurs farm it out through a network of debt relations, gathering moral and ac-
tual credit which can be called in, should an opportunity or emergency arise. The bless-
ing of this (as in all ROSCAs) is that such money is always at work.
ROSCAs have existed on the Indian sub-continent long before the introduction of 
the highly successful microcredit institution founded by Professor Yunus 33 years ago, 
well-known as the Grameen Bank. The Grameen Bank offers small loans to women, for 
the purchase of such things as a cow, or a sewing machine perhaps, which they pay back 
with the profits from surplus milk, or dressmaking. Chit Funds had many local names; 
some of them were commercially driven.
Formerly banks used to ignore the poor, due to the high administrative costs of small 
accounts. Bankers also believed the poor to be bad debtors. How the views of bankers 
and economists have changed! The women in their R0SCAs, Professor Yunus and many 
other NGOs, have proved these wrong. The Gatsby Trust in Cameroon is an NGO which, 
in 1985-1989 and in 1990, loaned out money to women who already had ROSCA groups. 
The Trust gave the women training in capacity building, and business techniques. It held 
local trade fairs. A study in 2002 noted recovery rate for the loans was 97%. Only 35% of 
women said that they had more decision-making power due to Gatsby. Husbands and 
in-laws were sometimes non-cooperative. 83% said they sought their husband’s agree-
ment before they got involved in enterprises. Only 34% held “bank accounts” separate 
from their husband’s. Only 12% who got a bank account did so because of Gatsby. The 
women used their money for consumption, to solve family problems, cover illnesses, 
meet school fees, rents etc.afrika focus — Volume 23, Nr. 2 [18]
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In 1994, I was invited to a meeting at the Brookings Institution in Washington on 
“Financial Services and the Poor: U.S. and Developing Country Experiences”, funded by 
USAID. The bankers’ talk was all about mobilizing the money of the poor, and about 
transferring the high cost of administering credit onto their shoulders. Interestingly, 
they hoped that lessons from experiences abroad in providing financial services for the 
poor might be transferrable to the US home market.
Elsewhere, building societies and bankers in South Africa have been quick to eye 
the huge sums floating across the urban economic scene through stockvels (one of the 
local names for a type of ROSCA – see Burman and Lembete, 1995; Verhoef, 1999). In the 
Economic Times of India of 27th January 2007, we read that:
“The banking sector can discover the ‘fortune at the base of the pyramid’ by using 
this scheme/policy to provide real financial inclusion for the poor and also [itself] 
benefit in the process. Till now, banks were looking at these accounts from a purely 
credit perspective. Instead they should look at this from the point of view of meeting 
the huge unmet need of the poor for savings. The poor households want to save and, 
contrary to the common perception, do have the funds to save, but it is not easy for 
them. Informal mutual savings systems like … ROSCAs, widespread in Africa, and 
‘thrift and credit groups’ in India demonstrate that poor households save.”
In Argentina also, bankers have their eyes on ROSCA money. In February 2009, I 
was informed by Professor Carlos Velez-Ibanez, who is updating his original monograph 
on ROSCAs in Mexico, that “There is a bit of an interesting development process in that 
Nissan, Volkswagen, and other commercial ventures have now incorporated ROSCAs in 
order to finance the purchase of their automobiles and other companies who specialize 
in household wares, computers, and other electronic devices like television sets and so 
on” (Velez-Ibenez, personal communication).
Over the years, various governments have taken an interest in microfinance associa-
tions, especially in ASCRAs and large ROSCAs conducted mainly commercially. Japan 
and India have had special legislation for KÕ and Chit funds for some time. Yet many 
authorities have hesitated to interfere with ROSCAs, for fear of stifling them or sending 
them underground. As for the law, Rowlands (1995 p. 115) notes that, in Cameroon:
“The importance of … debt in the maintaining of business networks is most clearly 
seen in the astonishing fact that, while bankruptcy proceeding legally exists…, it is 
rarely taken advantage of by creditors….”
In Cameroon there is a tradition of mutuality, and a desire to maintain harmony, 
especially since some have fears of witchcraft. Sensibility to the feelings of others avoids 
the stress on shaming found in some Asian and other contexts. So, in Cameroon, rath-
er than going to court, “People look immediately to the rescheduling of debts through 
collective bargaining with creditors, and converting the debt into a social resource”   afrika focus — 2010-12 [ 19 ]
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(Rowlands, op. cit.). Here we come to the all important “social capital” again.
Economists too are lured by ROSCA money. They devise complicated formulae – 
long equations – which, for example, compare the value of allocating by lot or deciding 
by auction, or by other means (see e.g. Besley, et al., 1993). And every now and then, there 
is a discussion about introducing intermediary institutions between grassroots ROSCAs 
and formal financial institutions, attempting to get the best of both worlds. Thus, in No-
vember 2008, S. Bai Senghor, the Director of the Microfinance Department of the Central 
Bank of the Gambia, at a meeting in Tanzania at Africa’s Technical Workshop on Innova-
tions in Addressing Rural Finance Challenges in Africa, noted that his Government:
“continues to give due attention to the growth and development of the Microfinance 
sub-sector as it has been recognized as one of the most effective tools to alleviate 
poverty….”
Senghor wants to establish financial trusts which can manage or hold funds for mi-
crofinance institutions, or act as a link between them and a donor or bank. Such an apex 
or second-tier institution, he says, should not raise money direct from the public. That 
could be left to members of ROSCAs, ASCRAs and RESCAs who, consequently, would 
bear the responsibility of assessing credit-worthiness, and save the financial trust the 
heavy cost of administering small loans.
Senghor notes that donors, given the scales of the problem of rural financial serv-
ice delivery, donor policy and institutional support “can no longer neglect the grassroot 
institutions, but should see them as “the ‘bottom-up’ spike of a two-pronged approach 
to extending outreach into rural areas of the Gambia”. Like many well-meaning bankers 
and NGOs, as a member of his government he would like to get his hands on this inde-
pendent, largely self-sustaining circulation of ROSCA money. 
  Concluding Remarks
When I began to take an interest in ROSCAs all those years ago, it was Geertz’s idea, 
from his work in Java in 1960, published in 1962, that the ROSCA was an intermediate 
institution between traditional forms of cooperation and modern formal financial insti-
tutions which would fade away as members became more sophisticated. He was right, in 
so far as many members did acquire skills in handling money, and they came to see the 
merits in regularity, daily self-denial for long-term gains, in the value of reputation, and 
trust in legal protection. In effect they began to use banks, insurance companies and the 
like. The Scots and English once used the, now little-known, terms ménages or diddlum for 
their savings clubs through which women bought blankets and other household goods. 
Such ASCRAs still remain common in the United Kingdom, in the form of Christmas 
clubs and other savings clubs, while Credit Unions are expanding.
But Geertz was wrong, as I said at the time, in thinking that everywhere the RO-
SCA would fade away. In Africa – and elsewhere, including among immigrants in the 
USA (as Bridget’s case exemplifies) – ROSCAs are, if anything, proliferating. A friend of afrika focus — Volume 23, Nr. 2 [20]
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mine in the UK has been a professional financial adviser, and property owner, yet he still 
belongs to his ROSCA back in the village, as a sign of solidarity and of shared belong-
ing with his neighbours at home. For a while he was a member of an ASCRA in the UK 
(which I attended); it was composed of fellow “elite” Cameroonians (including doctors, 
accountants, computer experts), but differences of opinion in investment policy led him 
to resign, and go it more alone. This is the problem with ASCRAs, they need a high qual-
ity of leadership and, especially, a common understanding, such as the Kenyan women 
were given by the charismatic Mama Alice – not to speak of her contacts (Nelson, 1995). 
Wright (2008) has documented an opposite case – the demise of an ASCRA in Peru which 
failed because of favouritism of the officer, despite, or perhaps because of, her contacts: 
she gave all the loans to her friends.
We have seen that groups, such as school friends, often continue their cycles for 
decades. As they advance in life, their dues are likely to go up, and their “picks” become 
bigger. If some of the members become more affluent than others, they will form a new 
high-value group which runs in parallel with their original group – and belong to both, 
for to abandon their less prosperous friends would be frowned upon.
Trust is important then. In Cameroon, traditional beliefs in witchcraft or sorcery 
are not forgotten. One particular form of witchcraft found among the coastal people of 
Cameroon, called nyongo, was associated with unwittingly touching (charmed) money, 
from which bewitchment followed. This belief was widespread when we first went to 
Cameroon. My husband wrote a paper in 1970 about it, entitled “Witchcraft, Economics 
and the Continuity of Belief” (in Douglas, 1970, reprinted in Ardener, The Voice of Proph-
esy). He showed how preoccupation with this sort of witchcraft rose when times were 
bad, and fell away when the economy flourished. At the time, personal economic success 
not shared was considered to be incompatible with family and community acceptability. 
In the past, traditional ceremonies (for example Eyu among the Bakweri of Cameroon) 
could be performed by successful men, whereby wealth – then mainly in the form of live-
stock – was redistributed (see Ardener 1956). In return for their generosity they received 
high moral regard. Such men were the equivalent of the big benefactors who founded the 
Oxford colleges and of contemporary philanthropists like Bill Gates.
Under colonialism, modern opportunities, open only to the few, introduced new 
inequalities and disrupted the former village harmony to a certain extent. People became 
suspicious of others who were wealthier than their fellows for no very apparent reasons, 
especially if members of their families died unexpectedly. Men who suddenly prospered 
became at risk of being regarded as nyongo witches, who seemed to kill their kin, while 
in fact the kin became the un-dead – working unseen on the known, but mystical, Mount 
Kupe, creating wealth for the big men (Ardener, in Douglas 1970; reprinted Ardener, 
1996, p. 41ff). Such traditional beliefs, in the context of money, were one reason why 
members used to scrutinise potential newcomers so carefully. This also accounts for 
why, in some groups in Cameroon, members drink from the same pot of raffia wine (Ian 
Fowler, personal communication).
Given this background, it is interesting that five or so years ago, already a time of afrika focus — 2010-12 [ 21 ]
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economic retrenchment, I was told by a senior colleague at a university in Cameroon that 
one member of her village ROSCA had had a number of near death accidents, and had 
consulted a diviner, who told her that one of the ROSCA members was practising nyongo 
against her. This led to the failure of the ROSCA. When I was preparing this paper I asked 
among my friends; several told me they had heard stories that such people existed in 
other places, among other Cameroon tribes.
Environmental catastrophes can also impinge on microfinance activity and on 
money transferring. It was reported in the Financial Times that, following the recent earth-
quake in Haiti, the main banks immediately closed their vaults while 42 offices (that’s 
about half) of the dominant microfinance agency (Fonkoze), which transfers remit-
tances from the US, remained open. Said by the World Bank to be worth $1.2 billion in 
2008, it is forecast that remittances to Haiti will double in 2010 (Rappeport and Mander, 
Financial Times, 21 January, 2010).
Likewise, war is disruptive. The current Somali conflict, which Anna Lindley exam-
ines, is most extreme. The role of London-based ROSCAs (with largely female member-
ship) in supporting war in Somalia was documented by Hazel Summerfield in Money-Go-
Rounds fifteen years ago. Lindley (2009, p. 520) recently writes that “there is now great 
interest in how extra-state economic activities, often with a significant global reach, be-
come part of the endogamous dynamics that protract conflict in Africa”. She talks of 
the “fundamental ambivalence of the international community” towards the informal 
shadow economies in Africa (Lindley, quoting Mark Duffield, 2002). Yet in the chaos of 
war, and the breakdown of infrastructure, Somalians continue to operate extensive net-
works of money transmitting businesses, with over one thousand branches, employing 
thousands of employees and agents. Unsurprisingly, the USA became suspicious that 
these operations were aiding terrorists, and in 2001 intervened to close the largest down.   
European governments have been less paranoid about them.
ROSCAs are known for their flexibility, which gives them ways of coping with finan-
cial fluctuations. Cycles are often kept short (frequently lasting for just one year) so that, 
when the cycle restarts, dues can be adjusted downward (in hard times) or upwards (as 
members become more affluent). A ROSCA can also quickly adjust to hard times by spac-
ing out times for paying dues – say by collecting them monthly instead of weekly, or by 
suspending them over Christmastide.
Because “picks” can lose or gain value through price fluctuations and inflation, RO-
SCA dues can be tied to the cost of a commodity, such as a gold coin (Cyprus, see Khatib-
Chahidi 1995), or the price of a zinc roofing sheet (Indonesia, see Hospes 1995).
As for today, the current credit crunch is a more than usually dramatic an event.  Due 
to this, Stiglitz notes a possible intellectual crisis of confidence in formal Western-style 
banking, and for American-style capitalism (Stiglitz, quoted in Cramer et al., 2009, p. 
653). An even more pessimistic view of the flow of money between Africa and overseas, 
over the past four decades, was given by David Smith (in Guardian.co.uk on April 1rst 2010). 
He suggested that during this period, Africa may have lost more than £1tn (tn=trillion) 
in illegal flows of money which have gone into western financial institutions, due to false afrika focus — Volume 23, Nr. 2 [22]
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pricing, tax evasion, etc. This, if true, vastly exceeds official accounts of inflows to Africa. 
Yet countries have coped with financial calamities before today. When all economic 
activity in Taiwan was in financial shock, ROSCA participation dropped from 1983 to its 
low in 1985. In their 1993 paper, Besley and Levenson provide graphic representation of 
the slide; they do not go into any detail, but report how confidence was soon restored 
and ROSCAs quickly rose to near their earlier levels. Also the IMF view of recent events is 
somewhat optimistic: it discounts the direct impact of the world financial markets crisis 
on many sub-Saharan economies, stating that they are only weakly integrated in global 
markets (see Cramer et al., 2009, p.647). In Lesotho, remittances account for 30% of its 
GDP. Senegal, where recorded remittances have increased dramatically over the last five 
years, and which now represent 11% of its GDP, is likewise seen to be relatively unaf-
fected by the financial crisis. And remittances from overseas to Nigeria are said to have 
weathered better than elsewhere. Moreover, it is thought that China and India, which are 
doing better than many other countries, are likely to continue their economic support for 
Africa.
However, the world recession could have some impact on aid and on remittances 
home. Certainly, my Cameroon friends are aware of the problem, and they assure me that, 
in these troubled days of credit crunch, people cling even more strongly to their various 
savings clubs than before. Professor Fanso told me in January 2010 that recently people 
have become particularly sensitive to risk, and financial instability. He reported that the 
practice in a ROSCA in Cameroon now is that, besides having a compulsory subscription 
to an interest-paying loan box (the RESCA), there is another separate fund (an ASCRA) to 
which members may voluntarily subscribe – when and as much as they wish. An account 
is kept of each member’s contribution to the ASCRA; this money can be drawn on by the 
subscriber in times of sudden financial need. So we have, in effect an ASCRA nesting 
inside a RESCA, inside a ROSCA. In other words, this ASCRA is a proto-bank. As noted 
above, to make this system sustainable requires a considerable degree of mutual trust 
and transparent accounting.
Let us finally return to Bridget and her efforts to assist her people.  Her case may not be 
typical; she is a model of prudence not all can emulate. Living costs are high and many have 
large families to support. But Bridget’s case does highlight the role ROSCAs play in remit-
tances sent home to the developing world. I understand the flow of aid returning from the 
African diaspora now outstrips the formal aid from Western governments and NGOs. The 
proliferation of formal money transfer offices in small towns in Cameroon is a recent sign 
of this flow. Mobile phone messages certainly speed up flows from money businesses over-
seas to Cameroon, and visa versa. The transferring of money between mobile telephones 
is said to be rapidly expanding in parts of Africa; their role in direct money exchanges in 
Cameroon has yet to be assessed. Reinvesting money back home often proves difficult for 
immigrants. Their cash has, however, significantly improved housing, health and educa-
tional standards. ROSCAs still play a role in this. ROSCAs are alive and kicking!afrika focus — 2010-12 [ 23 ]
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